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PROTECTING ANONYMOUS EXPRESSION: THE INTERNET'S
ROLE IN WASHINGTON STATE'S DISCLOSURE LAWS AND
THE DIRECT DEMOCRACY PROCESS
Karen Cullinane*
"The rate at which the internet has grown and evolved into a univer-
sal source of news and information has left the legal community in its
dust. The time has come for the law to begin establishing its place in
this vast abyss.'
INTRODUCTION
The Internet created a new and convenient means of accessing
practically unlimited information. With regards to publicly reveal-
ing the privately held political views of others, however, it is time to
establish a limit to the Internet's ability to disseminate information.
Without such a limitation, the individual right to anonymous polit-
ical expression will be forfeited. Despite Justice Stevens' assurance
in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,' decided in 1997, that the
Internet does not invade an individual's life "unbidden,"3 the issues
at the heart of Doe v. Reed,4 recently decided by the United States
Supreme Court, suggest that Justice Stevens underestimated the
Internet's capacity to disclose traditionally private information.
The events leading to litigation in Doe v. Reed began when the
Washington State Legislature passed the "Everything But Marriage
Act" (EBM Act) in May 2009, which expanded the rights to which
Washington State citizens in domestic partnerships were entitled to
encompass all of the rights already enjoyed by married citizens.
Private citizens who signed a referendum petition (R-71) to put
the Act to a public vote claimed that their constitutional right to
anonymous political speech was threatened after several gay
rights organizations promised they would obtain the petition un-
der the Washington Public Records Act (PRA) and post the
J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Michigan Law School; Wellesley College, BA
2005. Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 44. Loving
thanks to my family for their unwavering support.
1. Too Much Media, L.L.C. v. Hale, No. MON-L-2736-08, 2009 WL 2578521, at *7
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 10, 2010).
2. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
3. Id. at 869.
4. 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
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names and addresses of the signers on publicly accessible, search-
able websites.' This case pitted two fundamental American
freedoms against one another: the right to access information that
enables evaluation of the legislative process versus the right to sup-
port political and ideological causes anonymously.6 By granting one
right absolutely and at the expense of the other, however, the
Washington Secretary of State and the reviewing courts ignored
the pivotal role the Internet played in the conflict and subsequent-
ly precluded the possibility of its accommodating the demands of
both rights in the context of this case.
In addition, Washington's existing precedent and statutes did
not provide a clear framework with which the Reed courts could
analyze and balance competing interests, while accounting for the
pervasive nature of the Internet, particularly with regard to invol-
untary disclosure. After all, when the Washington legislature
passed laws establishing disclosure and privacy rights of its citizens,
thus setting up the framework for Reed, it could not have predicted
the emergence of the Internet, let alone the Internet's limitless
capability for disseminating information. A UCIA Law professor
specializing in cyberspace communications warned twelve years
ago: "[t]he new communications technologies are transforming
our society, propelling us further into the Information Age. And as
we accelerate into this new era, we slam into new problems or old
ones that have morphed into unrecognizable shapes. One such
problem is information privacy, which the coming cyberspace
threatens."' The contentious relationship between anonymous po-
litical speech and transparency central to Reed is one such "old"
problem morphed into an unrecognizable shape. Accordingly, le-
gal scholars and practitioners must recognize that the Internet's
role in disclosing and spreading, without limit, information about
individuals is modifying our country's conception of fundamental
freedoms.' Reed signals that it is time to acknowledge that by mak-
5. As of May 9, 2011, no websites have posted the information on R-71.
6. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2817-18 (2010) (noting the legitimate and funda-
mental interests of both sides).
7. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1193,
1284 (1998) (internal footnote omitted).
8. See Linda Greenhouse, Into the Closet, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (an. 14, 2010, 9:34
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/into-the-closet/ (noting that the
Supreme Court's decision that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit could not
broadcast on YouTube.com the oral arguments in Hollingsworth v. Peny, the Proposition 8
case, "suggests that a merger of two separate lines of First Amendment precedent, one on
freedom from compelled disclosure and the other on access to government proceedings,
may not be far off. In fact, in this media-saturated age, it may be overdue. Whether this
deeply divided court can navigate the contested terrain of same-sex marriage to arrive at a
useful synthesis is another question.").
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ing ideological and previously understood to be private aspects of
one's life transparent to all, the Internet is rapidly eroding the in-
dividual-and thus, everyone's-right to choose what to publicly
express. Following this controversial case, Washington State's Leg-
islature now has the opportunity to modify disclosure laws and
referendum processes created when disclosure possibilities were
not nearly as expansive and intrusive as they are now, and to do so
in a way that reflects a compromise between two valuable interests.
This Note proposes that the Washington State Legislature
amend its Public Records Act to exempt from public disclosure
personal information legally required to be disclosed by signers of
referendum petitions. This Note also proposes that the Washing-
ton State Legislature designate an electronic system, to be detailed
in its election law, by which referendum petitions can be checked
for fraud without violating the right to anonymous expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Part I describes Washington State's
referendum process and the path of Doe v. Reed, the case animating
the reform presented in this Note. Part II illustrates how the rise of
the Internet complicated the interpretation of the PRA; this sec-
tion further demonstrates that the PRA could not have been
intended to apply to referendum petitions. Part III proposes a stat-
utory reform to Washington's PRA. Finally, this Note concludes
that such a reform simultaneously advances the ideals of transpar-
ent government and an election process imbued with integrity,
while providing a shield of anonymity for petition signers wishing
to maintain a degree of privacy when participating in an expres-
sive, direct, democratic process.
I. EVENTS LEADING UP TO Doe v. Reed AND Reed's PATH
THROUGH THE COURTS
The "Everything But Marriage" Act was passed in Washington
State in November 2009. The Act extended all rights, not previous-
ly granted, and except where prohibited by federal law, attendant
to marriage to persons in domestic partnerships: specifically, rights
concerning adoption and employee benefits such as pensions or
insurance coverage.9 A referendum measure to overturn the EBM
Act was submitted to Washington State voters on the November
9. Rachel La Corte, Next Debate in Washington: Gay Marriage?, SEATTLE TIMES, May 17,
2009, at B2, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2009228905-
domesticpartnershipsl7m.html; Rachel La Corte, Wash. Senate Passes "Everything But
Maniage" Bill, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009) http://seattletimes. nw source.com/htmi/
localnews/2008838858 apwaxgrdomesticpartnerships1sddwritethru.html.
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2009 elections ballot as R-71, but a majority voted in favor of not
repealing the EBM Act, marking the first time in U.S. history that
voters approved a state ballot measure extending the rights of
same-sex couples." This approval by Washington citizens qualified
Washington State as one of the ten U.S. States whose citizens were
willing to offer the most rights to same-sex couples."
Voter approval of the EBM Act also placed in doubt whether a
majority of Washington State citizens continued to support the
State's 1998 implementation of the 1996 Federal Defense of Mar-
riage Act (DOMA), which gives states the option of legally defining
marriage exclusively as the union between a man and a woman.1
The Washington State statute applying DOMA explicitly invoked
the will of the in passing a law pertaining to marriage; section
26.04.010 of the Revised Code of Washington was modified to read
that the Washington legislature and the people of Washington
State found that "[marriage] matters should be determined by the
people within each individual state and not by the people or courts
of a different state."13 The slim majority rejecting R-71, however-
only 53%' 4-by no means indicates a decisive majority likely to hide
any real hints of dispute. On the contrary, it highlights the division
within the state on a traditionally polarizing social issue, illustrating
the roughly equal strength of support for both sides. The compet-
ing rights at issue in the context of Reed similarly embody an
equivalent opposition in that there is not necessarily a clear victor.
A. Washington State's Referendum Process
More than half of U.S. states permit at least one of two forms of
what is referred to as direct democracy. One form, the initiative,
allows members of a state's electorate to petition to place new laws
10. La Corte, Next Debate in Washington: Gay Marriage?, supra note 9.
11. SeeJeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion & Policy
Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 367, 373 (2009).
12. See Washington: Statewide Relationship Recognition, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://
www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions/washington.html (last visitedJan. 29, 2010); see generally
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2005) (stating the legislature's intent "to fully exercise the
authority granted the individual states by Congress in (DOMA] to establish public policy
against same-sex marriage in statutory law that clearly and definitively declares same-sex
marriages will not be recognized in Washington, even if they are made legal in other
states."). Then-governor Gary Locke vetoed the implementation of DOMA, but was overrid-
den by the legislature in a matter of hours.
13. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.04.010 (2010).
14. Mark Walsh, On the Campaign Trail: Court Weighs Arguments for Anonymity on Public




on a state ballot. The other form, the referendum, allows members
of a state's electorate to petition to get an act recently passed by the
legislature on a ballot, so that state citizens can then vote to uphold
or overturn the act.'] The Constitution of Washington State permits
both forms, and thus allows its citizens to reject a law or part of a
law as long as petitioners comply with the statutory requirements
for putting initiatives or referendums on election ballots. A refer-
endum petition must be submitted not more than ninety days after
the final adjournment of the session of the legislature that passed
the act." If the number of valid signatures on the timely-submitted
petition is equivalent to or in excess of 4% of the number of votes
cast in the most recent gubernatorial election, the act will be
placed on the ballot for the next November election to be ap-
proved or rejected by all registered voters in the state.' In addition
to signing a referendum petition and printing their names, peti-
tion signers must also disclose their home addresses and the
county in which they are registered to vote.'9
After a referendum petition is filed, the Washington Secretary of
State verifies the petition by canvassing the names on the petition.
Washington State law provides that this process
may be observed by persons representing the advocates and
opponents of the proposed measure so long as they make no
record of the names, addresses, or other information on the
petitions or related records during the verification process ...
The secretary of state may limit the number of observers to
not less than two on each side, if in his or her opinion, a
greater number would cause undue delay or disruption of the
verification process. Any such limitation shall apply equally to
both sides.20
15. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE INITIATIVE AND REFEREN-
DUM PROCESS IN WASHINGTON STATE 3 (2002), available at http://Iwvwa.org/pdfs/studies/
init-ref-study.pdf.
16. The two related forms are often addressed together due to the shared characteris-
tic of citizens voting to pass or repeal a law, but it is crucial to not confuse the forms'
respective processes: whereas a referendum allows the public to express Support or opposi-
tion to an existing bill drafted and passed by the legislature, an initiative is undertaken when
a group or individual proposes a new state law to be submitted to the legislature or voters.
OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, ELECTIONS Div., FILING INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN
WASHINGTON STATE 5 (2011), available at http://www.secstate.wa.govt/elections/pdf/filing
initiativeand referenda manual_2005-2008.pdf.
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.72.160 (2010).
18. WASH. CONST. art. II, § I(b) (amended 2007).
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.72.130 (2010).
20. Id. § 29A.72.230.
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After completing the verification process, the Secretary of State
issues a determination as to whether the petition contains the req-
uisite number of valid signatures. Any citizen unsatisfied with this
determination can appeal it by filing an action in the state superior
court requesting a citation requiring the Secretary of State to sub-
mit the petition for court evaluation.
B. Doe v. Reed: The Case Animating Reform
Alarmed by the state legislature's passage of the EBM Act, which
Governor Christine Gregoire signed into law on May 18, 2009, citi-
zens opposing the law formed a political action committee called
Protect Marriage Washington (PMW) to sponsor a referendum pe-
tition to overturn the EBM Act and put the issue of whether the
rights within the Act should be granted to domestic partners to a
public vote. PMW initiated the signature collection process neces-
sary for the referendum.23 It collected roughly 138,000 signatures
of Washingtonians and submitted the petition to the Secretary of
State by the end ofJuly 2009 in compliance with the statutorily pre-
scribed 90-day time period. Two organizations promptly
requested the list of those who signed the petition and publicly de-
clared that they would post online the names and addresses of the
signers to make the gay marriage debate public. In their requests
for the petition, the groups cited Washington State's Public Rec-
ords Act (PRA), passed in 1973, which granted public access to
government documents so that Washington State citizens could be
informed of and maintain control over the government institutions
created by and for the people.
21. Id. § 29A.72.240.
22. According to a mission statement on its website, the purpose of PMW was to "or-
ganize the effort to gather the 120,577 required signatures for Referendum 71 by July 25,
2009 to bring the controversial Senate Bill 5688 before the voters of Washington State in
November." The belief animating the group's efforts was rooted in the concern that mar-
riage would soon be available to same-sex couples: "In truth, [the EBM Act] will demolish
the state's historical understanding and definition of marriage as that of uniting a man and
a woman for life as Washington State will immediately become subject to litigation by same-
sex partners demanding that the courts overturn the Defense of Marriage Act and impose
'same-sex marriage' ... ." PROTECT MARRIAGE WASH., http://protectmarriagewa.com/ (last
visitedJan. 5, 2011) (emphasis omitted).
23. Complaint at 4, Doe v. Reed, No. 09-5456BHS, (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2009), rev'd,
586 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2009), affd, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.72.160(1) (2010) (providing a 90-day period during which
signatures can be collected in order to qualify a referendum for the ballot); see also FILING
INITIATIVES & REFERENDA IN WASHINGTON STATE, supta note 16, at 6.
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2010). See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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WhoSigned.org (WhoSigned), one of the organizations that re-
quested the petition, was expressly formed for the purpose of
exposing R-71 signers via a searchable database on the organiza-
tion's website .2 The home page of WhoSigned's website features an
image of a bright spotlight and states, "We believe the process for
initiative and referendum petitions that maintain discrimination
... must meet a high standard of transparency to ensure a fair and
open discussion in the public forum."27 KnowThyNeighbor.org
(KTN), the other organization that requested the petition, was
formed in 2005 to enable anyone wanting to "stand up for equal
rights" to find the names and addresses of "friends, neighbors,
family, co-workers, etc." in a searchable database of persons who
signed petitions circulated primarily to repeal state legislation ex-
panding gay rights." KTN encourages "neighbor-to-neighbor
advocacy" and claims it exists to "ensure" that "face to face
conversation [s]" happen with those who signed ballot initiative
petitions.
Within days, two unnamed individuals who had signed the peti-
tion-John Doe #1 and John Doe #2-along with PMW moved for
an injunction and a temporary restraining order against Sam Reed,
in his official capacity as Washington's Secretary of State, and
Brenda Galarza, in her official capacity as Washington State's Pub-
lic Records Officer. The remedies sought would prevent disclosure
of personal information contained in the referendum petition to
third parties requesting the petition under the PRA. The Com-
plaint included two counts. Count I, a facial challenge, alleged that
the PRA violated an individual's right, protected by the First
Amendment, to speak anonymously, since the PRA was not narrow-
ly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Count II, an
as-applied challenge, alleged that in the context of R-71, the PRA is
unconstitutional since it creates a reasonable probability that signa-
tories would be subjected to threats, harassment, and reprisals."
The Complaint noted WhoSigned's and KTN's intentions to
publicly disclose petitioner information on the Internet in a
searchable format and also their hopes that petition signers would
be confronted by R-71 opponents. The Complaint also mentioned
26. SeewHOSIGNED.ORG, http://www.whosigned.org (last visitedJan. 5, 2010).
27. Id.
28. Aleu KnowThydghbor.org KNowTHYNEIGHBOR.ORG, http://www.knowthyneighbor.org/
national/ (last visitedJan. 5,2011).
29. Id.
30. Complaint at 10-11, Doe v. Reed, No. 09-5456BHS (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2009),
rev'd, 586 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2009), affd, 130 S.Ct. 2811 (2010).
31. Id. at 6.
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concerns that potential reprisals for the particular political views
disclosed would consequently inhibit citizens from participating in
direct democracy processes in the future.
Citing reasonable likelihood of irreparable harm to an individu-
al's First Amendment freedoms, Judge Settle of the Western
District of Washington granted the temporary restraining order.3 3
Although neither of the State Respondents had responded to the
initial motion, they appealed the order. In the meantime, on Sep-
tember 2, 2009 Secretary of State Sam Reed certified R-71 even
after throwing out nearly 16,000 signatures because they were ei-
ther duplicates or invalid because the signer either was not a
registered voter or had not filled out the required referendum in-
formation properly.3 4 The following day, the District Court granted
motions to intervene submitted by Washington Families Standing
Together and Washington Coalition for Open Government, allow-
ing those two organizations to join the State Respondents in their
appeal. On September 10 the Western District held that the First
Amendment protected an individual's right to participate anony-
mously in the political process and further, that it is always in the
public interest to protect individual fundamental constitutional
36
rights, including the right to anonymous political expression.
Reed and Galarza promptly appealed this decision.
On appeal, although the Ninth Circuit explicitly acknowledged
that the PRA burdened the expression undertaken when signing
referendum petitions and also said it had no views on whether such
signing was a legislative act, on October 22, 2009 it reversed the
District Court based on the premise that the District Court had
falsely designated the political speech implicated as expression en-
titled to anonymity." The Court of Appeals provided four reasons
32. Id. at 8.
33. Reed, No. 09-5456BHS, slip op. at I (W.D. Wash.July 29, 2009).
34. SEC'Y OF STATE SAM REED, CERTIFICATION OF REFERENDUM 71 (2009),
available at http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/initiativesReferenda/Documents/R-71%
20Certification.pdf.
35. Washington Families Standing Together was founded to preserve domestic part-
nership laws in Washington State and, more specifically, to ensure that the signatures on
R-71 were valid. See Anne Levinson, Statement from Washington Families Standing Together Con-
cerning Litigation Filed on August 27th to Protect Families In Washington State, APPROVE71.ORG,
http://approvereferendum7l.org/08/statement-from-wafst-about-litigation-filed-today/
(last visited May 9, 2011). The Washington Coalition for Open Government was formed to
"act as an independent, non-partisan, non-profit organization dedicated to promoting and
defending the People's right to know in matters of public interest and in the conduct of the
public's business ... to help foster open government processes, supervised by an informed
and engaged citizenry, which is the cornerstone of democracy." Mission Statement, WASHING-
TONCOG.ORG, http://www.washingtoncog.org/mission.php (last visitedJan. 5, 2011).
36. Doe v. Reed, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200, 1205 (W.D. Wash. 2009).
37. Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
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why the signatures were not anonymous speech: 1) the signatures
were gathered in public, indicating that the gathering process
made no promises as to confidentiality of identity; 2) since each
petition page had 20 spaces for signatories, a signer's identifying
information could be seen by up to 19 other signers; 3) the peti-
tion could not be understood as confidential because it is
submitted to the State for verification; and 4) Washington law un-
ambiguously gives both proponents and opponents of a petition
the right to observe the verification process." The opinion further
explained that, in determining whether the PRA was unconstitu-
tional, the District Court improperly applied a strict scrutiny
standard rather than an intermediate scrutiny standard. The in-
termediate scrutiny standard was more appropriate in Reed since
speech was accompanied by conduct-here the act of signing the
referendum petition-thus relaxing the level of scrutiny applied.39
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, the PRA is constitution-
al so long as the suppression of speech resulting from a burden on
expression is only incidental and the burden is no greater than
necessary to justify an important government interest. 40 The court
found that this standard was met, reasoning that the PRA "does not
prevent the petition signers from signing the petitions or from
otherwise lawfully qualifying their referendum for a vote. At most,
it might deter some voters from signing the petition."4 ' The court
also stated that disclosure of signature details furthered transpar-
ency in government functions, an important state interest
42unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
A few days after the decision was submitted on appeal to Justice
Anthony Kennedy, who handles Ninth Circuit emergency matters,
the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the lower court's injunction until
the Supreme Court decided the case. The Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari on January 15, 2010" and on April 28, 2010 heard
oral argument. The transcript of the arguments reveals that almost
all of the Justices seemed to support the State's contention that
disclosing all referendum and initiative petitions furthered the
State's interest in transparency and accountability in an electoral
process. Refusing to address the question as to whether the PRA
38. Id. at 678 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1976)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 679.
41. Id. at 678 n.1 1 (emphasis in original).
42. Id. at 679.
43. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 486 (Kennedy, CircuitJustice 2009).
44. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 1133 (Jan. 15, 2010) (mem.).
45. Transcript of Oral Argument at passim, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No.
09-559).
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was unconstitutional as-applied since that question was then pend-
ing in the District Court, the Supreme Court held 8-1 that the PRA
was not unconstitutional on its face and that states have ample lee-
way in structuring their voting systems. The Court allowed for the
disclosure of identities in a referendum petition when requested by
any citizen-even by those looking to widely disseminate the in-
formation for the sole purpose of exposing another's previously
privately-held beliefs.4 6 The Court, however, did note that when a
referendum addresses a particularly controversial subject, if raised
in an as-applied challenge and signers could show their political
expression of support would likely induce harassment, the petition
might reasonably be deemed exempt from public disclosure.
II. UNFORESEEN AND OVERLOOKED EFFECTS OF
INTERNET DISCLOSURE ON FIRST AMENDMENT
& INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY RIGHTS
Neither the parties nor the courts involved in Doe v. Reed denied
that the case addressed issues regarding freedom of speech and
that the nature of the relevant speech was political. Neither did any
parties involved deny that the First Amendment protects anony-
mous political speech. The Ninth Circuit, however, circumvented
this First Amendment protection in Reed, by specifically holding
that the R-71 signers were not actually speaking anonymously in
signing the petition. The Ninth Circuit thereby avoided character-
izing the issue in Reed as whether the PRA violated the signers'
rights by directing disclosure of political speech that should nor-
mally be accompanied by the right to anonymous expression.4
Further, the Supreme Court also failed to address the necessity of
clarifying the ambiguous PRA to account for the Internet as a new
disclosure mechanism that significantly alters the relationship be-
tween public disclosure and expression of support for a
referendum petition.
Since the founding of the U.S., the ability to express oneself
anonymously, especially with regard to political or idealogical is-
sues, has been held invaluable by persons wishing to join together
for political and social change yet avoid social stigma or other
46. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2827 (Sotomayor,J., concurring).
47. Id. at 2823-24 (AlitoJ., concurring).
48. Although the Supreme Court held that referendum petitions could be disclosed
under the PRA since the Act was not unconstitutional on its face, the Court at least acknowl-




backlash that may result from engaging in unpopular speech."
This fundamental right played an essential role in the debates that
built the structure of the U.S. political and legal system. If it were
not for the right to anonymous expression, we might not have had
the Federalist Papers, which were published by Alexander Hamil-
ton, James Madison, and John Jay under the alias "Publius" to gain
public support for ratification of the U.S. Constitution. 0 Recently
the Supreme Court affirmed its understanding of a fundamental
right as a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."5 1 Such rights
are generally protected to the highest degree." Under this
definition, it is close to inconceivable that one could find a more
fundamental right than that to anonymous political expression.
The Supreme Court has pointed to the Federalist Papers as the
origin of the right to anonymous speech protected by the First
Amendment numerous times, most notably in McIntyre v. Ohio Elec-
tions Commission, which held that Ohio's statutory prohibition
against distribution of anonymous campaign literature violated the
First Amendment.53 In McIntyre, the Court dismissed the contention
of the State of Ohio that a reader can better evaluate a message in
a political pamphlet if informed of the pamphlet's author.4 In that
opinion, justice Stevens wrote:
Insofar as the interest in informing the electorate means
nothing more than the provision of additional information
that may either buttress or undermine the argument in a
document, we think the identity of the speaker is no different
from other components of the document's content that the
author is free to include or exclude ... The simple interest in
providing voters with additional relevant information does
not justify a state requirement that the writer make statements
or disclosures she would otherwise omit. Moreover, in the case
of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to
the recipient, the name and address of the author add little, if
49. See id. at 2839 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
50. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960).
51. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
52. Id.
53. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (pointing to the
Federalist Papers as an example of potentially unpopular political speech which required
protection of anonymity due to the potential for political persecution); see also Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981); Hynes v. Mayor & Council
of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 625 (1976) (BrennanJ., concurring).
54. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-49.
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anything, to the reader's ability to evaluate the document's
55
message.
Considering the high level of protection the Supreme Court has
traditionally afforded anonymous political expression, one could
apply Justice Stevens' reasoning to the circumstances involved in
Reed: disclosing the identity of a petitioner does not add or detract
any value from the petitioner's vote. McIntyre is distinguishable
from Reed in that it involved distribution of anonymously distribut-
ed political literature rather than anonymous disapproval of a law
through a referendum. Yet the disapproval in Reed is more analo-
gous to voting on political issues normally protected by the secret
ballot and thus merits a higher degree of protection regarding the
anonymity of political views.
In Reed, Respondents claimed that public disclosure is valuable
because voters are generally entitled to know all relevant infor-
mation about a political issue to be able to properly evaluate it."
Respondents do not sufficiently explain, however, what the specific
identities of citizens supporting a measure on a ballot reveal about
the petition's "message"-likley because individual identities reveal
nothing about the underlying issue. As Justice Alito said during
oral argument in Reed, "if I see that John Jones from Seattle signed
this petition, that tells me absolutely nothing."5 Thus there is no
informational benefit to disclosing the identities of individuals
supporting a political opinion that might trump free speech.
Contrary to this idea, the founder of KTN stated, "for social
change to happen, there has to be a shaming part .... Discussion,
not intimidation, is the goal .... I'm trying to get you to under-
stand that if you're going to try to take away my rights I want you to
know what you're doing."5 8 This statement, however, only under-
scores the harmful role disclosure can play when political opinions
expressed through referendum petitions are exposed. No matter
how repugnant a view may seem, shaming the person who holds it
discourages citizens from participating in a political process open
to everyone-not just those holding a viewpoint held by a majority
or even just those with the courage to act on their views.
55. Id.
56. Reply Brief of Appellants at (D), Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos.
09-35818, 09-35826).
57. Transcript of Oral Argument at 56-57, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No.
09-559).




The Respondents contended that disclosing the identities of and
personal information about persons who signed R-71 promoted
government transparency and protected referendums from fraud.
There was no evidence, however, that disclosure was needed in
Washington State to prevent fraud or that the State's existing veri-
fication process did not suffice to prevent fraud."9 It is notable that
although one amicus brief harped on the potential fraud within
petitions, providing examples over the course of the past century
from several states that use the referendum process, none of these
examples were from Washington State, a state infamous for utiliz-
ing direct democracy, but were instead from faraway states
including Florida, Massachusetts, Maine, and Oklahoma."e As one
commentator concluded,
such disclosure [of the identities of petition signers] could as-
sist the state authorities in detecting fraudulent or otherwise
invalid petition signatures as a form of "crowd sourcing." But
there is no indication that [public] disclosure [of petition in-
formation] would have served this purpose in [Reed], whereas
it is plausible to think that disclosure of the supporters of the
petition would have facilitated harassment of at least some
61such supporters.
Disclosure obviously assists state authorities in avoiding fraud as the
counting and canvassing process aims to do, and in Reed, this pro-
cess was accomplished, as the Secretary of State attested. The
public need for the petition information, however, was simply not
an issue in this case since Washington State had a clear process that
already served the interest of fraud prevention.
Moreover, the Court's reasoning in McIntyre indicates that con-
cerns about fraud are not serious in cases like Reed because, as
Justice Stevens contended, the threat of fraud in collecting public
votes on referendums or candidate elections "simply is not present
59. This conclusion was reached decades ago by Washington State Attorney General
Don Eastvold who wrote that state referendum signature verification laws were drafted par-
ticularly to facilitate government oversight since they allowed observers, representing
members of the public, to be present during the canvassing process. See Letter from Don
Eastvold, Washington State Attorney General, to Herb Hanson, Washington State Repre-
sentative (May 28, 1956) in Petitioner Exhibits to Complaint, available at
http://wei.seestate.wa.gov/osos/en/initiativesReferenda/Pages/R-711nformation.aspx. See also
infra Part H.C.
60. Brief for Direct Democracy Scholars as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
18-19, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-599).
61. Michael C. Dorf Is There a Constitutional Right to Sign a Petition Anonymously,
FINDLAW (Nov. 16, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20091116.html.
62. SEC'Y OF STATE SAM REED, supra note 34.
SUMMER 2011 ] 959
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
in a popular vote on a public issue."63 Admittedly, in some circum-
stances disclosure is necessary to reveal more serious instances of
fraud. For example, there is widespread support for disclosure of
identities of donors and expenditures involved in campaign fi-
nance." The need for the public to monitor victorious politicians
who might favor those who bankrolled their election at the ex-
pense of the American public is much greater than the need to
publicly monitor individuals who agreed that an issue should be
put to a public vote. Additionally, the Supreme Court treats mone-
tary expenditures as less personal statements of political support,
making it easier to justify disclosure requirements concerning fi-
nancial support as opposed to purely ideological support." As all of
the Justices during oral argument, the Respondents, and Petition-
ers acknowledged, some citizens might not sign a referendum
petition they support if they know that their support will not re-
main confidential.6 6 The resulting chilling of speech would defeat
one of the most important aims and benefits of direct democracy
through referendums: expanding the base of individual partici-
pants., Ironically, limiting the number of signatures on a petition
precludes the public from engaging in a statewide discussion about
gay marriage and distorts the public's understanding of how preva-
lent support-or lack of support-is for a particular issue. A Wall
Street Journal poll revealed that "three out of five people said they
would think twice about their association with a ballot-issue com-
mittee if it meant public disclosure of their names and addresses.
The reason most often given was a desire to keep their involvement
anonymous." 8 This chilling effect prevents citizens from contrib-
uting to the marketplace of ideas, thereby preventing fellow
citizens from better understanding the true extent of a view's ac-
ceptance in wider society. Worse, it could prevent the requisite
number of signers from signing a referendum, causing an effort to
fall just shy of the minimum number of signatures needed to put
an issue on the ballot for a public vote.
63. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 353, 356 n.15 (1995).
64. See Elizabeth Garrett, A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance Reform: Voting with Cues,
37 U. RICH. L. REv. 1011, 1011 (2003).
65. See id. at 355.
66. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-
559).
67. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 15.
68. Dick Carpenter, Neighbor Against Neighbor, WALL ST.J., Apr. 28, 2010, at A.17.
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A. Interpretation of Washington State's Disclosure Laws
Almost every article written about Doe v. Reed seems to proceed
from an unspoken assumption that the Washington State PRA un-
ambiguously requires disclosure of identifying information about
referendum petition signers.9 Analysis of the text of the PRA and
other historical evidence, however, reveals that this is a false as-
sumption with consequences too serious to ignore. The
Respondents' main argument is that petitions are public records
providing information pertinent to an electoral process, and that
the personal information contained in the petitions is crucial for
an accurate evaluation of political issues and therefore is not ex-
empt from release.o Many news organizations and newspapers filed
amicus briefs, together and individually, in support of this argu-
ment.7' This is unsurprising, considering that news organizations
69. See Les Blumenthal, Conservative Group Doesn't Sway Scalia in Ballot Signature Case,
McCLATcHY NEWSPAPERS (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/28/
93054/supreme-court-skeptical-on-hiding.html ("Under Washington [S]tate's Public Rec-
ords Act, the names of those who signed the petition are public information, but Protect
Marriage Washington filed a lawsuit in federal court that sought to keep the names secret.");
Harriet Robbins, US. Supreme Court: LGBTs and Conservatives Ironically Switch Positions in Peti-
tion-Signing Disclosure Case, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.upi.com/
TopNews/US/2010/04/25/US-Supreme-Court-LGBTs-and-conservatives-ironically-switch-
positions-in-petition-signing-disclosure-case/UPI-
4 2 9 9 1 2 7 2 179700 ("The 9th [C]ircuit's
decision should prevail because Washington's law was clear that referendum signatories'
names may be released to the public."); see also Greenhouse, supra note 8 (assuming that
"[ulnder Washington's Public Records Act, the signatures on referendum petitions are pub-
lic records, available for inspection and copying"); Dahlia Lithwick, What's Your Sign?, SLATE
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2252251 ("Washington's Public Records Act
makes those names a matter of public record in the interest of transparency and public
inspection.").
70. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, ELECTIONs Div., RELEASE OF INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM PETITIONS (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://blogs.secstate.wa.gov/
FromOurCorner/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Acr65.pdf ("There is no dispute that initia-
tive and referendum petitions are public records. Once filed by the sponsors, the petitions
are in the custody of a public state agency and contain information relating to the conduct
of government or the performance of a governmental function."). See also Referendum 71
Litigation in Federal Court, WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/
initiativesReferenda/Pages/R-71Information.aspx (last visited May 5, 2010); Doe v. Reed,
BALLOTPEDIA.ORG, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.phptitle=Doev._Reed (last visited
May 5, 2010).
71. Brief for National and Washington State News Publishers, News Broadcasters, and
News Media Professional Associations as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Doe v.
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (Apr. 1, 2010) (No. 09-599). Brief for the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, Gannett Co., International, National Newspaper Ass'n, Newspaper
Ass'n of America, Radio Television Digital News Ass'n, and Society of Professional Journalists
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (Apr. 1, 2010) (No.
09-599). Some of the more well-known and potentially influential names among them are
National & Washington State News Publishers, News Broadcasters & News Media Profession-
al Associations, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, National Newspaper
Association, Newspaper Association of America, Society of Professional Journalists, Thomson
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and reporters historically have opposed laws limiting access to in-
formation or potentially impeding their ability to research and
report." News organizations likely do not want Reed to set a prece-
dent that might restrict reporter access to any public documents,
whether referendum petitions or otherwise. It is far from clear,
however, that referendum petitions are classified as public records
under Washington State law, despite claims of third parties who
would not suffer any consequences from publically disclosing sensi-
tive information. The Elections Division in the Office of the
Secretary of State of Washington claims that the petitions at issue
in Reed fall under the following definition of a legislative docu-
ment, referred to in the PRA's "Definitions" Section:
"[L]egislative records" shall be defined as correspondence,
amendments, reports, and minutes of meetings made by or
submitted to legislative committees or subcommittees and
transcripts or other records of hearings or supplementary
written testimony or data thereof filed with committees or
subcommittees in connection with the exercise of legislative
or investigatory functions . . . .
If classified as legislative documents the referendum petitions are
arguably public records. It is noteworthy then that neither the
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court explicitly referred in their
respective opinions to the petitions as legislative documents."
Reuters, The Seattle Times Company, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall
StreetJournal, Cox Media Group, Gannett Co., and various local Washington State newspa-
pers. Id.
72. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 967 (1964); Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2004); De-
troit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2003); Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d
310 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); Dietemann v. Time,
Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1998).
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 40.14.100 (2010). See INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PETITIONS
Q & A, OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF STATE, ELECTIONS Div., RELEASE OF INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM PETITIONS (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://blogs.secstate.wa.gov/
FromOurCorner/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Acr65.pdf.
74. In refusing to determine whether signing a referendum petition is a legislative act
the Ninth Circuit said, "[b]ecause we assume, for purposes of this case, that signing a refer-
endum petition is speech, we do not reach this argument [that signing a referendum
petition is not speech, but is instead a legislative act] and intimate no view on it." Doe v.
Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 677 n.9 (9th Cir. 2009). In response to Respondents' argument that




Despite the Washington State Election Division's claim that ref-
erendum petitions are public documents, referendum petitions do
not clearly fall under a plain reading of the statute's definition of
"legislative records." On the contrary, there is significant evidence
that not only disproves the State's conclusion, but that justifies a
legislative reform of Washington State's PRA with regard to refer-
endum petitions to dispel any confusion between the new
Elections Division disclosure policy and Washington State policy
prior to Reed. The PRA's statutory language; public understanding
of disclosure rules; the historical background of the PRA's passage;
the policies of Washington's former Attorneys General and Secre-
taries of State; and the likely consequences of previously
unforeseen widespread Internet disclosure of signer information,
all contribute to the inference that the Washington State Legisla-
ture did not intend for referendum petitions to be disclosed in
their entirety to anyone requesting them and should be protected
accordingly through state legislation.
B. The Language Within the Public Records Act
and Related Election Law
In addition to the PRA's plain language definition of a legislative
document, there are clues within other sections of the Act that
should have led to the finding that referendum petitions are not
public records subject to disclosure in Washington State. For in-
stance, Section 42.56.230 of the PRA, titled "Personal information,"
exempts from public inspection information that would violate
Washington residents' individual right to privacy-specifically,
documents and related materials used to prove identity and resi-
dential address and other personal information required to apply
for a driver's license. Logically, the principle of protecting per-
sonal information under this section should extend to protect
identity and residential addresses disclosed in referendum peti-
tions. Section 42.56.210 of the PRA, titled "Certain personal and
other records exempt," which also exempts certain information
[ilt is true that signing a referendum petition may ultimately have the legal conse-
quence of requiring the secretary of state to place the referendum on the ballot. But
we do not see how adding such legal effect to an expressive activity somehow deprives
that activity of its expressive component, taking it outside the scope of the First
Amendment.
Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 211, 2818 (2010).
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.230 (2010).
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from public disclosure, indicates that information that would vio-
late an individual's privacy should be redacted from an otherwise
publicly disclosable document. This section explicitly states that
"[n]o exemption may be construed to permit the nondisclosure of
statistical information not descriptive of any readily identifiable person or
persons. This language indicates that "statistical information" de-
scriptive of otherwise unidentifiable persons should not be disclosed
under the PRA. This language presents the possibility that, at the
very least, residential addresses can be redacted from public rec-
ords because disclosure of such information is indeed descriptive
and allows for the violation of a signer's privacy. This language in
the PRA thus lends even stronger support for the inference that
personal information such as the name and address of an individu-
al who supports the referendum should be redacted since the
language of the PRA itself indicates that information descriptive of
an identifiable person is not subject to disclosure. What is more
descriptive than information indicating the location of a private
citizen's residence or their ideological views or views of govern-
ment processes, all of which can be gleaned from a disclosed
referendum petition?
As to whether names and addresses of petition signers have been
exempt from disclosure, an Eighth Circuit case, Campaign for Family
Farms v. Glickman," is particularly instructional. In order to deter-
mine what identifying information was protected from disclosure
under the personal privacy exemption in the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act78 (FOIA), the Court balanced the privacy interests of
individuals against the public interest in disclosure for the purpos-
es of government oversight." In Glickman, a group called the
Campaign prepared a petition calling for a referendum on new
regulations requiring pork farmers to pay the National Pork Board
an assessment on every pork transaction they completed.o After
the Campaign submitted the petition, which included the names
and addresses of 19,000 referendum petition signers, the National
Pork Board requested the identifying information of petition sign-
ers under FOIA.8' The federal government initially determined
that the identifying petition information did not fall under a per-
76. Id. § 42.56.210 (emphasis added).
77. 200 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 2000).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1994); see also infra Part II.C.
79. See Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).




sonal privacy exemption akin to Section 42.56.210 of the PRA. 2
However, the Eighth Circuit reversed, noting that the disclosure of
personal information on a politically charged document similar to
a secret ballot associates individuals with substantive political be-
liefs-far from simply revealing statistical information."
Consequently, an individual's interest in the privacy of potentially
ideological, identifying information was deemed to be more sub-
stantial than the public's interest in its oversight of a petition
verification process. There is no reason why a personal privacy
exemption under FOIA should not accordingly apply under the
PRA's personal privacy exemption, especially since the referendum
petition context, not often found in U.S. case law, is present in
both Glickman and Reed.
The conclusion that residential information on referendum pe-
titions was not meant to be publicly disclosed is further supported
by the Ninth Circuit's characterization of a home being a man's
castle and his "den" or refuge in Dietemann v. Time, Inc. In Di-
etemann, the court held that a newspaper violated an individual's
right to privacy by publishing a newspaper article about this indi-
vidual, as well as details relating to his home and profession." The
court specifically noted an increasing trend in the court recogniz-
ing privacy interests, emphasizing the notion that a man could
reasonably expect privacy with regard to his residence and not
have its location broadcast "to the public at large."" The court spe-
cifically noted that the plaintiffs home in that case did not exhibit
identifying information: not only did the residence not have any
signage on the outside identifying the plaintiff or occupation, but
the plaintiff was also unlisted in telephone directories. These facts
buttressed the court's determination that reporters were not entitled
to violate the plaintiffs privacy by publishing his home address.
Thus case law, as well as Washington statutory law, indicates that a
person should be able to have a reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding their home. In the context of a referendum petition,
providing an address that is then disseminated on the Internet for
anyone to see seems even worse than the violation of the right to
privacy protected in Dietemann from more limited newspaper
82. Id. at 1184-85; see also 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6); infra Part II.C (noting that the PRA
was modeled on FOIA).
83. Glickman, 200 F.3d at 1187-88.
84. Id. at 1189.
85. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1971).
86. Id. at 249.
87. Leonard Niehoff, Class Lecture, Civil Liability: Intrusion & Other Newsgathering
Torts, Mass Media Law, University of Michigan Law School (Mar. 9, 2010) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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exposure in 1971-especially considering that after the home ad-
dresses of the California donors to the controversial Proposition 8
campaign were listed on the Internet, dozens of instances of har-
assment were directed at them or their property."
Similarly, Section 42.56.540 of the PRA, titled "Court protection
of public records," provides courts with discretion to prevent dis-
closure where "examination would clearly not be in the public
interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any per-
son, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital
governmental functions."89 The Ninth Circuit should have exer-
cised this discretion to affirm the judgment of the District Court in
Reed. Upholding the constitutional right to express one's political
views anonymously is in the public interest since every citizen pos-
sesses that right and has a similarly strong interest in expecting it
to be protected consistently. Further, the abridgment of the First
Amendment right to anonymity here would cause irreparable
damage as a result of the invasive disclosure, especially unaccepta-
ble due to the fundamental and thereby highly protected nature of
the right to expression under the First Amendment. The Supreme
Court has held in cases involving severe restrictions on the right to
individual belief and association under the First Amendment that
"[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal peri-
ods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."90
It is important to clarify that the right to anonymous expression
does not always subordinate conflicting fundamental rights, even
when the right to anonymous expression is irreparably damaged. If
a government interest is strong enough, it may be justified by al-
lowing for the pursuit of a right considered more fundamental
than the right to anonymity, as exemplified by campaign finance
laws implemented to combat corruption in government, a signifi-
cant state interest mentioned in McIntyre.' But the purpose of the
referendum process-to broaden the base of participants in the
democratic process-could be diluted to the point of irrelevance if
anonymous support is not an option."
88. Brad Stone, Prop 8 Donor Web Site Shows Disclosure Law is 2-Edged Sword, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2009, at BU3, available at www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/business/08stream.html
(noting how disclosure of residential information of those who provided financial support
for the Proposition 8 campaign, which limited marriage to union between a man and a
woman, led to various incidents of harassment of supporters in their homes). See also infra
Part II.D.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.540 (2010).
90. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). See also supra text accompanying note 51
(defining "fundamental right").
91. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 353, 356 n.15 (1995).
92. Id.; LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 15, at 2.
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In contrast, in Meyer v. Grant, after applying strict scrutiny-
making the application of only intermediate scrutiny in Reed all the
stranger-the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a
law that forbade payment to petition signature collectors. The Su-
preme Court found that the interest of protecting the petition
process from corruption did not outweigh the interest in overcom-
ing barriers to the referendum process, including difficulty in
communicating a political message while quickly and efficiently
obtaining a certain number of signatures in a certain number of
days." The Court reasoned, "The circulation of an initiative peti-
tion of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for
political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed
change," characteristics of the highly protected core political
speech. Surely the fundamental nature of the core political
speech at issue in Reed, especially given the lack of a financial con-
text unlike that in Meyer, is enough to trump the fraud interest
summarily disposed of in Meyer.
Section 42.56.250 of the PRA, "Employment and licensing,"
states that employers, specifically public agencies, may not disclose
residential or other contact information of employees.9 Along the
same lines, during the Supreme Court oral argument, Justice Alito
asked Washington Attorney General McKenna if he would release
the personal contact information of government employees whose
names and government positions are available to any citizen who
requests the information under the Freedom of Information Act,
so the requester could have an "uncomfortable conversation[] with
them" at the public servant's home (one of the aims of the web-
sites, KTN and WhoSigned)."6 Attorney General McKenna
responded, "We could not release [the personal contact infor-
mation] because they can come to the office and have
uncomfortable conversations with them ... ."9 Surely Attorney
General McKenna cannot mean that keeping the addresses of gov-
ernment employees private is more of a priority than keeping
private the addresses of citizens.
93. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1988).
94. Id. at 421.
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.250 (2010).
96. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010)
(No. 09-559); see also About Know7TyNeighbor.org, KNowTHYNEIGHBOR.ORG, http://
www.knowthyneighbor.org/national/(last visited Jan. 5, 2011); WHOSIGNED.ORG, http://
www.whosigned.org (last visitedJan. 5, 2011).
97. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (No. 09-559).
98. Because it undercuts the proposition that those acting under the aegis of the gov-
ernment can be subjected to disclosure of their personal information, Attorney General
McKenna's response also significantly weakens the Respondents' important argument that
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More importantly, although Washington election laws require
that referendum petition signers disclose their identities by provid-
ing their residential addresses and counties on petitions, the only
apparent reason for this requirement is that the Secretary of State
and his employees can use this information to verify signatures on
petitions." Representatives for opponents and proponents of the
referendum petition can observe this verification process, but, con-
trary to the Ninth Circuit's finding in Reed, such observance does
not "waive" any right to privacy on behalf of the petition signers.'oo
That the PRA explicitly prohibits the observers of state workers
completing the verification process from writing down any identify-
ing information, including the names and addresses of signers,
undeniably indicates a strong privacy interest in protecting the
signers' identifying information. One of the Respondent briefs
speculates, "it seems apparent that this time-limited restriction on
recording petition information is designed to avoid disruption of
the signature verification process, and does not make petition in-
formation confidential."'0o The brief, however, provides no support
for this suggested explanation, and there is no apparent reason
why avoiding disruption during the verification process is a vital
aim that would be effectively advanced by prohibiting the tran-
scription of identifying information. Finally, disclosure of the same
information under the PRA that is statutorily protected during the
verification process would render the prohibition meaningless.
This consideration provides unambiguous proof that the legisla-
ture never intended for identifying information to be shared with
anyone beyond those who verify the legitimacy of signatures.
C. Historical Context of the PRA
Washington voters passed the Washington State PRA through
the initiative process in 1973, reflecting a nationwide movement
promoting government openness and transparency. Seven years
earlier, in 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Freedom
of Information Act, which afforded anyone who submitted a re-
quest access to federal government agency documents not falling
when private citizens sign a referendum petition they are acting like senators engaging in a
legislative act. See infra II.C and note 105 and accompanying text.
99. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 29A.72.130, .150, .230 (2010).
100. Id.; see also supra Part I.
101. Reply Brief of Appellants at II(A)(1), Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (Nos. 09-35818, 09-
35826), 2009 WL 4922610, at *4.
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under one of nine discretionary exemptions. o2 According to lead-
ing media scholars, "[T]he Act's basic philosophy remains that
government records are presumed to be available for public scru-
tiny because open government is better government.""o' Just a few
years later, the Watergate scandal permanently damaged public
trust in government, providing additional support for the public
need to monitor governmental actions undertaken in the name of
and for the supposed good of the public.
Washington State's PRA similarly reflected the trend of states in
the 1960s and '70s in passing disclosure legislation to promote
government transparency and ensure that government servants
were properly serving the people that elected them. The PRA's
"Construction" section, which expresses the aims animating the
PRA, states:
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the
agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority,
do not give their public servants the right to decide what is
good for the people to know and what is not good for them to
know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they
may maintain control over the instruments that they have cre-
ated. 104
Washington State citizens undoubtedly have a right to oversee gov-
ernment actions since they elect government representatives into
office who are then rightfully accountable to the public. The PRA's
stated objective, however, does not mean that the public has a right
to know what other citizens are up to, even if they are participating
in a form of direct democracy like signing a referendum petition.
The question then becomes whether referendum petitions should
be considered documents illustrating details of government action,
potentially legislative in nature if rejection or affirmation of a legis-
lative act is successful, or considered documents containing
personal information pertaining to private citizens and their politi-
cal or ideological beliefs. The answer is undoubtedly the latter.
In their brief, Respondents likened a private citizen signing a ref-
erendum petition to a U.S. senator proposing a bill on the Senate
floor. In this misplaced comparison, Respondents intended to
show why the speech element of a petition is not of a private,
anonymous nature, leading to the conclusion that referendum
102. DAVID KOHLER & LEE LEVINE, MEDIA AND THE LAW 665-67 (2009).
103. Id. at 665.
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2010).
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petitions are not exempt from the PRA.1os Importantly, Respond-
ents failed to note that in their capacity as public servants U.S.
senators do not act as individual citizens entitled to all First
Amendment protections against the State.' The State cannot possi-
bly have a First Amendment claim against itself; senators serve as
accountable government actors and are not necessarily entitled to
political anonymous expression when they voluntarily take the
Senate floor in their public capacity to express the needs and views
of their constituents rather than their own.o' This is due to the
structure of American constitutional government, premised on the
understanding that the First Amendment is a protection for indi-
viduals from the encroachment of their rights by state actors-such
as U.S. senators-and thus actually limits government expression. os
It follows that senators, representing a collective entity rather than
acting as a private individual, do not have a First Amendment right
identical to that of individual citizens. In fact, one scholar has not-
ed that despite an influx of communicative media and increased
technological capabilities it is possible to infer that government
speech rights are actually shrinking when compared to individual
speech rights.'09 Further, even though American case law has in-
creasingly defined individual free speech rights for roughly nine
decades, the Court has never addressed what the parameters of
government speech rights even are."o This huge gap between the
definitions of what individual citizens are entitled to and what sen-
ators are entitled to in terms of the First Amendment strikingly
shows Respondents' comparison of senators and citizens to be
downright reckless.
105. Reply Brief of Appellants at I1(A)(1), Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (Nos. 09-
35818, 09-35826), 2009 WL 4922610, at *4.
106. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the First Amendment free
speech clause against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
107. See Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem, 35 STAN. L. REv. 373 (1983).
See also Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, No. 10-568, slip op. (June 13, 2011), just
recently decided, in which the Supreme Court noted that legislators are not protected by
the First Amendment as regular citizens are because a government actor's legislative power
is not personal to him or her and instead belongs to the people. Quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521
U.S. 811, 821 (1997), in which the Court denied Article III standing to legislators claiming
their voting power was diluted by a statute providing for a line-item veto, the Court said, "the
legislator casts his vote 'as trustee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal pow-
er.' " No. 10-568, slip op. at 8 (June 13, 2011).
108. MARK YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT Ex-
PRESSION IN AMERICA 160 (1983) ("This is consistent with older notions that the
Constitution embodies norms against government secrecy, that the First Amendment is a
check on official abuse of power, and that it restrains and does not enhance government
powers.").




Additionally, senators propose and pass laws in a much more di-
rect way than citizens do when they sign a referendum petition;
thus it is even more questionable to place citizen approval or rejec-
tion of a law already passed by the state legislature in the same
category. When comparing the former, a legislative process, with
the latter, at best a quasi-legislative process, "direct democracy"
then becomes a somewhat misleading term and eclipses the action
it actually entails: voting to vote, the purpose of which is to "give voters
an opportunity to approve or reject laws either proposed or enacted by
the Legislature.""' So even in the case of "direct" democracy's refer-
endum petition process, the public acts as a quasi-legislative check to
the legislative branch, expressing support of or opposition to a law
already created by or enacted by the legislature, leading to the conclusion
that Respondents' comparison is inappropriate. Signing a referen-
dum petition cannot be equivalent to actions undertaken by elected
representatives if the respective actions do not have the same effect
or force. This is especially true considering that if a petition is not
certified the public will not even vote on the issue, an important
fact noted by Justice Thomas in Reed."'2 Also, in order to provide a
check on the legislature, the signer cannot be a legislator; a more
appropriate check, as laid out in the various Articles of the U.S.
Constitution, would be the judicial or the executive branches. As
further support for the conclusion that the Respondents were mis-
placed in equating the direct democracy process with the
traditional legislative process, the Washington State Constitution
emphasizes that the people, even when participating in referen-
dum or initiative measures, act "independent of the legislature,"
the latter of which is vested with legislative authority."'
Further, a referendum petition merely places an issue on the
state ballot during an election so that all Washington citizens can
vote to approve or reject contested legislation. If any part of the
referendum process should be classified as an act of government it
should be the component that actually leads to a bill's acceptance
or rejection. Under that logic, the identifying information of all
Washington voters should be disclosed, because the ultimate voters
are more similar to direct legislators than are the citizens who mere-
ly get a referendum or initiative on the ballot. Our nation's election
system, however, is set up in a way that allows voters to maintain
confidentiality in voting, keeping the votes resulting from a
111. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERs, supra note 15 (emphasis added).
112. Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2839 (2010) (Thomas,J., dissenting).
113. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1.
SUMMER 2011 ] 971
University of Michigan journal of Law Reform
referendum secret.1 1 4 The only natural inference then is that the
vote initiated to bring about a vote must also be kept secret. Any
signing citizens could then reasonably, and would likely, be under
the impression that their support and identifying information
would also remain confidential."' At oral argument before the Su-
preme Court, when Attorney General McKenna said that signing a
referendum was telling the government to do something, Justice
Kennedy told him, "then it's more like a vote. And there-there is
strong interest in keeping the-the vote private,""6 a basic infer-
ence the Ninth Circuit should have made. Even more telling,
California, Washington's fellow Ninth circuit member, keeps referen-
dum petitions confidential."'
Because the PRA passed by initiative, Washington State voters
endorsed and approved it, and therefore arguably also approved
disclosing personal information provided by referendum petition
signers. Justice Scalia made this point during oral argument in
Reed, saying that, "the people of Washington evidently think that
[disclosure] is not too much of an imposition upon people's cour-
age, to-to stand up and sign something and be willing to stand
behind it. . . Now, if you don't like that, I can see doing it another
way. But-but the people of Washington have chosen to do it
this-this way.""' Even accepting Scalia's unproven assumption that
the Washington voters in 1973 fully understood that under the
PRA those participating in direct democracy were not voting but
were instead acting as elected members of the government did and
should thus be held publicly accountable, such approval does not
114. Interestingly, Justice Scalia vehemently defended the importance of the secret bal-
lot in maintaining the integrity of the election process in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191
(1992), a First Amendment case upholding a state law banning pollsters and campaigners
from any location within 100 feet of a polling place on Election Day, despite the curious
nature of the claim that the political speech of pollsters might be able to impede the voting
process taking place within the walls of the building nearby. Justice Scalia protected the
right to participate in a democratic process against the immemorial First Amendment pro-
tection of political campaign speech in a traditional public forum such as the sidewalk
surrounding a polling place. Id. at 203 (Scalia,J., concurring). Yet in his Doe v. Reed concur-
rence, in order to weaken the protective claim voting may provide referendums, Scalia took
great pains in pointing out the fact that the secret ballot was not an established right until
1888, and, incredibly, he cited Buron for support. Id. at 2834 (Scalia, J., concurring); see
DAVID A. SCHULTZ & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE JURISPRUDENTIAL VISION OF JUSTICE
ANTONIN SCALIA 140-41 (Rowman & Littlefield 1996). -
115. It is worth noting that citizens did not request the information in referendum peti-
tions until 2006 at the earliest. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (No.
09-559). This fact indicates that citizens could have believed petition support was indeed
more like a vote than an act of legislation.
116. Id.at46.
117. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6253.5 (West 1995).
118. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (No. 09-559).
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mean that voters necessarily approved of disseminating identifying
information in the manner intended to be undertaken by
WhoSigned and KTN. Disclosure in 1973 was very different from
disclosure in 2011 due to the vast differences in technology's
communicative capabilities.
It is curious then that during oral argument before the Supreme
Court, neither the Justices nor counsel for the Petitioners noted
that the PRA was enacted nearly four decades ago, whereas it was
not until the mid-1990s that private use of the Internet beyond that
of scientists and academics began to take hold."9 Due to the exist-
ence of the Internet, in the present day it does not require much
time, effort, or thought to compile and spread personal infor-
mation about someone and potentially use it in a manipulative or
harmful way. In 1973, there was neither Internet nor any compara-
ble method of quickly and easily sharing referendum petitions with
the public. Even if someone managed to share petitions on a
somewhat widespread basis by photocopying and distributing
them, there was no way to quickly or easily search petition copies
for specific signers like there is today with electronic "search func-
tions"-the exact method sites like KTN and WhoSigned are
designed to facilitate. One could not log onto the Internet and dis-
cover whether or not one's neighbor had signed a referendum
petition in a matter of seconds.
Eightmaps.com (eightmaps), the website that identified mone-
tary donors to Proposition 8 in California, exemplifies how the
unforeseen development of the Internet perverts the original pur-
pose of disclosure laws. As Bard Stone from the New York Times
explained, eightmaps is:
... the latest, most striking example of how information col-
lected through disclosure laws intended to increase the
transparency of the political process, magnified by the power-
ful lens of the Web, may be undermining the same
democratic values that the regulations were to promote. With
tools like eight maps-and there are bound to be more of
them-strident political partisans can challenge their oppo-
nents directly, one voter at a time. The results, some activists
fear, could discourage people from participating in the politi-
cal process altogether.120
119. Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 1095, 1099-1100 (1996).
120. Stone, supra note 88.
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Note the disturbing tension between the transparency of the polit-
ical process and transparency in determining the identities and
locations of political opponents. Eightmaps, a website not unlike
KTN or WhoSigned in that it was created for the sole purpose of
personally targeting individuals, similarly distorts the government
accountability objective of disclosure laws by furthering, and some-
times even promoting, harassment of private citizens for their
views. The president of the California Voter Foundation, which ad-
vocates open democracy, highlighted the central problem in this
case by saying of eightmaps, "This is not really the intention of vot-
er disclosure laws. But that's the thing about technology. You don't
really know where it is going to take you."m' The voters in 1973 did
not foresee that the PRA would cause names of referendum peti-
tion signers to be "taken" to an infinitely wide audience via
websites primarily for the purpose of forced discussion where sign-
ers would be pressed to explain why they signed the petition, which
does not further the cause of open government. If anything, dis-
closure furthers a bullying, majoritarian government which
deprives those holding minority views legislative protection since
they not only will lose to the majority of citizens who will triumph
in gaining legislative representatives, but will also lose out on the
opportunity to exercise the right to participate in direct democra-
cy, free from harassment, as a last-ditch effort to secure a voice.
Had Washington voters in 1973 foreseen the effect of the Internet
on the PRA, it is unclear whether voters would have passed the
PRA in its current form, still unreflective of the technology that
changes the meaning and consequences of public disclosure.
Finally and importantly, until recently, before and after the pas-
sage of the PRA, Washington government officials have refused to
release information identifying signers of referendums or initiative
petitions. For example, in 1938, Washington Attorney General
Garrison Hamilton wrote a letter to Secretary of State Bell Reeves
clarifying that the stance of her office should be refusal when ap-
proached by "interested persons" looking to inspect or copy
referendum and initiative petitions. Hamilton explained:
It is the public policy of this state that we uphold the secret
ballot in every-particular and these petitions are, more or less,
in effect a vote of those who sign the petitions requesting that
certain statutes be passed and made the law of the state. This




public records and your office should refuse to permit them
to be inspected and copied. 2 2
This indicates that the "ample leeway" states have in structuring
their direct democracy mechanisms, as qualified by the Supreme
Court in Reed, is not created in a vacuum and had already been set
up over 70 years ago in Washington State. This stance remained
steadfast nearly two decades later in 1956, when Attorney General
Don Eastvold informed Washington State Representative Herb
Hanson that petitions were not public records and could only be
viewed by members of the public in two instances: when present
during the canvassing process or if public prosecutors were investi-
gating signature fraud.'2 ' This was due to the private nature of the
signer information and an established state policy against disclo-
124sure.
Likewise, in 1973-the year in which the PRA was passed-
Secretary of State Ludlow Kramer affirmed this position in a letter
to Washington State Senator Hubert Donahue, who had requested
the names of citizens who signed an initiative petition repealing a
law increasing senator salaries:
As far as I am concerned petitions are not public records and
are being held in trust by this office. I consider the signing of
an initiative or referendum petition a form of voting by the
people. Furthermore, the release of these signatures have no
legal value, but could have deep political ramifications to
those signing. I will not violate public trust.
This statement, reflecting the consistent policies of the state and
resulting expectations of its citizens at the time the PRA was
passed, should have influenced the reviewing courts in Reed. Sup-
port for this understanding can be found in the admission by
Washington State Attorney General Robert McKenna that petitions
were generally not requested and furnished in response until 2006
or so, signaling a public understanding that such documents were
not meant for public consumption until the Secretary of State's
break with consistent state policy.'26
122. Complaint at 62a, Doe v. Reed, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (No.
05456-BHS).
123. Id. at 63a-66a.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 67a.
126. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-
559).
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The essential values currently animating disclosure policies
should not have radically changed from those deemed important
during the decades leading up to and at the passage of the PRA.
Courts should then give deference to the position taken by Secre-
tary of State Kramer, who arguably had the most intimate and
direct understanding of the PRA, since it was implemented and
first interpreted during his tenure. Technology, on the other hand,
has changed, and in a way that severely distorts the purpose of the
PRA, judging from the undeniably consistent policy of Washington
State officials in the past with regard to the disclosure of petitioner
information. Public officers alone possess power to protect their
constituents from individuals looking to peruse petitions for pur-
poses other than those related to overseeing government conduct,
and should therefore promote disclosure policies that effectively
protect citizens.
D. Unanticipated Consequences: Harassment
Following Internet Disclosure
Just as Washington voters in 1973 did not anticipate how future
technology advancements would pervert the PRA, the Washington
State Legislature did not anticipate it might have to legislatively-
address the capacity of the Internet to quickly spread personal in-
formation and, in turn, potentially subject Washington petition
signers to harassment. Although the Supreme Court analyzed Doe
v. Reed as a facial challenge rather than an as-applied challenge-
which would more properly address the potential for harassment
in the case at hand-potential harassment resulting from disclo-
sure remains a necessary consideration in shaping public
disclosure laws.'17 Legislatures must be proactive since it is nearly
impossible to provide a remedy for signers after their information
is disclosed and spread to an irremediable extent via the largely-
unregulated Internet. Further, the Supreme Court held instances
of harassment directed against individuals or groups in earlier cas-
es to be acceptable evidence for later as-applied cases in which the
same unpopular views were the focus.'"2
127. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (noting that the risk of har-
assment and reprisal against individuals exercising their First Amendment right to
association is a legitimate reason supporting the protection of anonymous speech and
privacy in political activity that might be unpopular); see also Transcript of Oral Argument
at 61-62, Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (No. 09-559) (arguing that an as-applied harassment chal-
lenge is relevant to a broader challenge).
128. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
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Even before Petitioners lost in the Supreme Court, the R-71
campaign manager for PMW, Larry Stickney, his identity already
publicly revealed through media attention following Reed, received
so many threats against him and his family via email and phone
that he had his children sleep in the living room of his home, away
from windows, and he called the local sheriff for protection.'29 Ex-
amples of instances of harassment likely to play out in the R-71
context as a result of reviewing courts, and now the PRA, mandat-
ing disclosure, already occurred in California following the
popular passage of the Proposition 8 Amendment to the California
Constitution. Eightmaps, mentioned earlier, is a website that uses
personal information gleaned from the petition, including names,
occupations, work addresses, and home addresses of persons who
donated money to the anti-gay marriage cause in order to create a
comprehensive map of California with clickable red dots, each rep-
resenting a donor and his or her corresponding personal
information.3 0 Using an Internet program like Mapquest or
Google Maps, which create user-friendly maps of and door-to-door
directions to and from specific destinations, eightmaps creates a
map identifying the areas in which donors to the Proposition 8
campaign live or work, or, if provided, their exact addresses. This
website has inspired many cases of vandalism, harassment, and
threats, as evidenced by the 70-odd declarations submitted by Peti-
tioners in Reed. One man said he received several emails from
people he did not even know, harassing him because his email ad-
dress was posted on this website.13 1 Another individual said some of
his coworkers confronted him, accusing him of "donating to
hate."'3 2 A disclosure law as construed by the Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit forces a citizen to choose between participating
in a democratic process and protecting himself or herself from
harassment resulting from the powerful capabilities of the Inter-
net. Forcing petition signers to reveal the details of their
residences in addition to their ideological views in order to partici-
pate in a democratic process surely cannot be the intention of a
disclosure law. As one professor said:
The key here is developing a process that balances the some-
times competing goals of transparency and privacy. Both goals
129. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 48, Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671 (9th Cir.
2009) (Nos. 09-35818, 09-35826), available at http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/
initiativesReferenda/Pages/R-711nformation.aspx.
130. See PROP 8 MAPs, http://www.eightmaps.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
131. Stone, supra note 88.
132. Id.
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are essential for a healthy democracy and I think we are cur-
rently witnessing, as demonstrated by eightmaps, how the
increased accessibility of personal information is disrupting
the delicate balance between them.'
As this reform shows, the professor's hope that privacy and trans-
parency can be balanced to develop a healthier democracy is not
unrealistic and is even ideal since both interests are essential to a
well-functioning democracy.
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM: RECOGNIZING THE INTERNET
AS A PROBLEM TO TRANSFORM IT INTO A SOLUTION
From 1995 to 2010, a period of less than 15 years, Internet usage
in the U.S. increased from just over 10% of the population using
the Internet to nearly 80%.' We take for granted that with Inter-
net access we can discover whatever we can think of, whenever we
think to look for it, without a thought as to whether such infor-
mation was intended to be made public. Having the world revealed
to an individual is an empowering consequence of the Internet,
but also has a potentially less empowering, reciprocal component:
the individual can just as easily be revealed to the world.35
In Reed, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether the Wash-
ington State PRA could constitutionally direct public disclosure in
a manner that would reveal the identities of referendum petition
signers. Because the PRA was passed well before anyone could im-
agine "the instantaneity with which people can now transmit
information"" via the Internet, the role of this revolutionary tech-
nology must be considered to adequately answer questions such as
those presented in Reed-a case after which the need for the Wash-
ington State Legislature to take the necessary step in reconciling
the needs of open government and individual privacy is more pro-
nounced than ever.'13 Accordingly, the two-part reform presented
below accounts for the role the Internet has played in transforming
our ability to receive and disseminate information, and aims to ac-
133. Id.
134. Internet Adoption Over Time, PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT,
http://www.pewintemet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data/Internet-Adoption.aspx (last visited May
10,2011).
135. See Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKE-
LEY TCH. L.J. 1085, 1147 (2002).
136. Too Much Media, L.L.C. v. Hale, No. MON-L-2736-08, 2009 WNL 2578521, at *7
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 10, 2010).
137. SeeYUDOF, supra note 108, at 111-38.
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commodate the right to anonymous political speech as well as the
need for transparency of the political process and protection
against referendum fraud.
A. Signer Details on Washington State Referendum Petitions
Should be Exempt from Disclosure
The first part of this reform proposes a revision to Washington
State's PRA to explicitly exclude from public disclosure personal
information that petition signers are legally required to disclose on
referendum and initiative petitions. To implement this reform, the
Washington State Legislature should simply amend Section
42.56.230 of the PRA, titled "Personal information,ss which fol-
lows Section 42.56.210, titled, "Certain personal and other records
exempt.",3 9 Currently, "Personal information" is comprised of six
subsections and is preceded by text reading, "The following per-
sonal information is exempt from public inspection and copying
under this chapter . . . ."'" The legislature should implement a sev-
enth subsection that refers to what is currently section 29A.72.130
of the Washington Revised Code, which directs the form of refer-
endum petitions, but with this proposal would be
section 29A.72.130(1), as explained in the next section of this
Note. The new subsection of the PRA would exempt from public
disclosure information required when signing a referendum peti-
tion, and would exempt:
(7) Personal information of a signer of any initiative or refer-
endum petition required by Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.130(1),
including name, address, city, and the county in which the
signer is registered to vote, except when disclosure is request-
ed via the partial disclosure procedure outlined in Wash. Rev.
Code § 29A.72.140.14
138. WASH. REv. CODE § 42.56.230 (2010).
139. Id. § 42.56.210.
140. Id. § 42.56.230.
141. Although Wash. Rev. Code § 29A.72.140 (2010) currently briefly mentions the
warning statement state referendum petitions must include on petition sheets presented to
citizens in order to alert the public to the consequences of fraudulently signing, Id., in the
context of the proposed reform § 29A.72.140 would become a section describing the website
by which Washington State residents can enter personal information to discover if their
signature was properly verified on a particular petition. This change will be explained in
more detail in the following section of this Note.
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This simple exemption protects the privacy and First Amend-
ment interests of petition signers. Practically, it would enable
Washington citizens to anonymously sign referendum petitions
without fear that their political views and personal information
would later be spread via the Internet and thus potentially subject-
ing them to harassment. This amendment, however, completes
only half of the work of this proposed reform, and cannot be im-
plemented without further amendments to the PRA that would
preserve disclosure and transparency of the political process-the
original purpose of the PRA.
B. Incorporating an Online Partial Disclosure System into
Washington State's Referendum Petition Statutes
The second part of this reform proposes that the Washington
legislature mandate the creation of an electronic interface, availa-
ble over the Internet, which would allow Washington citizens to
easily verify whether their names were properly or improperly in-
cluded on a particular referendum petition. A point raised by
Justice Alito during oral argument of Doe v. Reed instructs this re-
form. Not only was Justice Alito the only Justice during oral
argument to ask Counsel for the State any questions about the
electronic nature of disclosure in this case, but he also appeared to
be the only Justice to recognize the need to balance the goals of
transparency and privacy when the Internet was otherwise an un-
fettered mechanism of disclosure.4 Justice Alito noted that if the
142. In fact, it is striking that the word "Internet" was uttered only four times in the en-
tire 57-minute long oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court: once by each of the
attorneys arguing and twice by Justice Samuel Alito. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8:14,
41:17, 42:5, 50:6, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-559). It is worth noting that
even though Justice Alito is not the youngest member of the court (Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Sotomayor are both 56 and Justice Kagan is 51; Justice Alito is 61 years old), his
interest in how technology affects the law was sparked many decades ago when he wrote the
final report for a privacy conference hosted by a mentor professor at his undergraduate
institution, Princeton University. He wrote in a section titled "Privacy and the Computer,"
"[t]he cybernetic revolution has greatly magnified the threat to privacy today," and conclud-
ed the report, "[w]e must begin now to preserve privacy, and the first step is for Americans
to understand the threats to privacy we now face and the threats inherent in our technologi-
cal society." Samuel Alito, Conference on the Boundaries of Privacy in Am. Soc'y.2, 7 (Jan. 4,
1972).
Regarding the justices' grasp of the effects of technology on legal analysis, consider the
following: following the April oral argument in City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619
(2010), which held that the city's review of officers' text messages on city-issued pagers was
reasonable and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court was reamed
in the media for its inability to grasp simple technology. See Kimberly Atkins, Technical Diffi-
culties at the Supreme Court, DC DicrA (Apr. 19, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://lawyersusaonline.com/
dcdicta/2010/04/19/technical-difficulties-at-thesupreme-court-2 (making fun of Justice Ken-
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real interest here was in preventing fraud and if petitions are now
verified in a digital format, the state could easily set up a website in
which citizens can enter personal information to see if their names
were signed on a petition by someone who was not them.1 13 "Why
does this all have to be put out on the internet?" he asked.'" He
then asked if creating a website in which voters would have to plug
in some kind of private identifying information in order to be able
to see whether they were added to a petition would also suffice to
serve the interest against fraud while protecting the anonymity of
the signers. Attorney General McKenna confirmed that it would.4 5
In addition, Attorney General McKenna mentioned during oral
argument that petitions signed and submitted in recent years were
digitized before the Secretary of State performed a validating
check to root out duplicate signatures and to ensure that all sign-
ers were registered voters.'" It follows that it would be feasible to
create a publicly accessible, digitized search engine that Washing-
ton State citizens could use for personal verification without
impeding upon the privacy of other petition signers. just as voters
can plug in their names and dates of birth to determine whether
they are registered to vote in Washington State, they could similarly
perform the same act with regard to referendum petitions.'4 7 The
identifying information should not be a birthday since that seems
easily discoverable through websites such as Facebook; it could be a
social security number, a driver's license number-anything that
would allow only the individual to determine whether the presence
or absence of his or her signature on a referendum petition is le-
gitimate. This would allow for transparency in the referendum
petition process while removing the invasive elements of disclosure
that conflict with individual privacy and First Amendment rights.
The Washington State Legislature would enact the latter portion
of this reform by modifying sections 29A.72.130 and 29A.72.140 of
the Washington Revised Code, which currently establish guidelines
for the referendum signature petition gathering process. Under
nedy's question of whether a text can "say, 'Your call is important to us, and we will get back
to you?'" but singling out Justice Alito for stumping counsel with a question as to whether
an employee could delete a text in a way that would prevent his employer from retrieving
the text from the wireless carrier); Ashby Jones, Our Tech-Savvy Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.L.
BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 5:56 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/19/our-tech-savvy-
supreme-court (mockingJustice Scalia for asking whether one could print out a text).
143. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (No. 09-
559).
144. Id. at 50.
145. Id. at 49-51.
146. Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2827 (Alito,J., concurring).
147. Id.; see also My Vote. Personalized Voter Information, WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE,
http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/VoterVault/Pages/MyVote.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
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this reform, however, the legislature would incorporate both sec-
tions into a single numbered statute-an amended
section 29A.72.130-under the single heading, "Referendum
petition requirements." The amendment would leave unchanged
the current titles of sections 29A.72.130 ("Referendum petitions-
Form") and 29A.72.140 ("Warning statement-Further require-
ments"), but these titles would become subheadings that instead
would fall under lettered subsections of section 29A.72.130
(becoming section 29A.72.130(1) and section 29A.72.130(2), re-
spectively). Section 29A.72.130 of the Washington Revised Code,
currently titled, "Referendum petitions-Form," addresses what
the text of a petition, as shown to a potential signer, should be;
what the text of an additional declaration printed on the back
side of the petition, to be signed by the signature gatherer, should
be; and what' additional information is required of a signer
(printed name, address, city, and county in which the signer is
registered to vote) .148 This reform would not change the text or
substance of this law, but would designate it instead as sec-
tion 29A.72.130(1) of the Washington Revised Code.
The pre-reform section 29A.72.140, titled, "Warning statement-
Further requirements," currently mandates that every referendum
petition contain a prominent "Warning" section that clearly ex-
plains the legal consequences to signers of including any false
information or falsely signing for another individual."" The re-
formed version would maintain the wording and substance of this
statute section as it currently stands, except the location of the sec-
tion would be designated instead as section 29A.72.130(2).
Under this reform, the amended section 29A.72.140, would be
titled, "Protected disclosure & signer verification process," and
would be new in substance and text. It would describe the afore-
mentioned electronic interface, to be hosted by the Washington
Secretary of State website, stating its purpose as enabling individu-
als to verify whether their names were properly or improperly
included on a particular referendum petition. In addition, the
amended section 29A.72.140 would include simple instructions
explaining how to use the verification website. It would read as fol-
lows:
(1) The signatures and identifying information included
in this petition by an individual signer may be veri-
fied by that, and only that, individual signer at the
Office of the Washington Secretary of State website,
148. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.72.130 (2010).




when the signer enters and submits his or her social
security number.
(2) The signature gatherer must include on the signature
and identifying information side of the petition a box
at least two (2) inches in height displaying the website
address [http://www.appropriateaddress.com] at
which signers and non-signers alike can verify whether
their signature was properly excluded from or includ-
ed in a particular petition.
Because the government is obligated to ensure that its legislative
processes are responsive to both the threats of widespread disclo-
sure to privacy, as well as to the needs of monitoring representative
government, the proposed reform places the onus on the Washing-
ton State Legislature to amend the PRA and related portions of the
referendum petition statutes to create an easy, non-invasive meth-
od of searching referendum petitions. The reform would use a
method similar to that of interfaces currently used by websites like
KTN and WhoSigned, but would be distinguishable by requiring
the entry of information likely known only by the individual to
whom it pertains, such as a social security number or voter registra-
tion ID, thereby calling up in a search (or not, if the signer was not
verified as signing the petition) only the information pertaining to
that specific individual who possesses the required identifying in-
formation. This proposal would avoid disclosing names and other
private identifying information in potentially damaging ways which
currently expose petition signers to harassment or simply to expo-
sure they do not want.
CONCLUSION
This Note demonstrates that the two rights at stake in Doe v.
Reed-the right to anonymous expression and the right to transpar-
ency in a corruption-free government-are not necessarily forever
mired in irremediable conflict. But Reed demonstrates that if courts
and lawyers continue to overlook the legal challenges inherent in
rapid technological development, unanticipated when the laws regu-
lating the implicated freedoms were drafted, some freedoms
previously taken for granted will be irrevocably lost. Without legisla-
tive action, particularly in the context of referendum petitions,
widespread disclosure of personal information via the Internet at
the expense of anonymity will be assured.
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To avoid the destruction of either competing fundamental right,
this Note provides a solution in the structure of a legislative reform
that balances the conflicting desires of signers to keep their politi-
cal expression anonymous, and of citizens to root out fraud and
increase accountability in quasi-legislative processes. When legisla-
tures begin to update laws to account for the Internet's
modification of rights implicating political expression, privacy, and
disclosure, legislatures must balance interests with an eye toward
compromise rather than toward prioritization in which one right
trumps the other.5 o If, as in Reed, public access always subordinates
individual privacy and political anonymity, the latter liberties will
be lost and likely never restored. As expressed by Professor Kang:
Historically, privacy issues have been an afterthought. Technol-
ogy propels us forward, and we react to the social
consequences only after the fact. But the amount of privacy we
retain is-to use a decidedly low-tech metaphor-a one-way
ratchet. Once we ratchet privacy down, it will be extraordinarily
difficult to get it back. More disturbingly, after a while, we
might not mind so much. It may dawn on us too late that
privacy should have been saved along the way.151
Reed aptly illustrates Professor Jerry Kang's concerns and exempli-
fies the risk that the Internet poses to privacy with regard to
political expression. If legislatures such as Washington State's fail
to act soon to retain the protection traditionally granted to those
supplying personal information that is required when expressing
political support of a contentious ballot issue, it will eventually be-
come close to impossible to recover such lost privacies in the
future.
150. Justice Stevens eloquently and reasonably emphasized the importance of consider-
ing the possibility of accommodating two seemingly conflicting fundamental rights. See, e.g.,
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 434 (2006) (StevensJ., dissenting). He wrote, "[W]hen
constitutionally significant interests clash, resist the demand for winner-take-all; try to make
adjustments that serve all of the values at stake." Id.
151. Kang, supra note 7, at 1286.
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